University of Michigan Law School

University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository
Articles

Faculty Scholarship

1992

Bioethics and the Family: The Cautionary View
from Family Law
Carl E. Schneider
University of Michigan Law School, carlschn@umich.edu

Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/articles/1942

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/articles
Part of the Family Law Commons, Health Law and Policy Commons, and the Medical
Jurisprudence Commons
Recommended Citation
Schneider, Carl E. "Bioethics and the Family: The Cautionary View from Family Law." Utah L. Rev. 1992, no. 3 (1992): 819-47.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Articles by an authorized administrator of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more
information, please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

Bioethics and the Family:
The Cautionary View from Family Law·
Carl E. Schneider••

I.

INTRODUCTION

For many years, the field of bioethics has been specially
concerned with how the authority to make medical decisions
should be allocated between doctor and patient. Today the
patient's power-indeed, the patient's right-is widely acknowledged, at least in principle. But this development can hardly be
the last word in our thinking about how medical decisions should
be made. For one thing, sometimes patients cannot speak for
themselves. For another, patients· make medical decisions in
contexts that significantly include more participants thanjust the
patient and doctor. Now, as this conference demonstrates,
bioethics is beginning to ask what role the patient's family should
play in making medical decisions.
In addition, bioethics has in recent years increasingly been
required to address another kind of problem: How should we
resolve the ethical dilemmas associated with matters of reproduction-particularly novel means of reproduction, like in vitro
fertilization and surrogate motherhood? As the technical capacities
of medicine have expanded, these bioethical questions have raised

* © Copyright 1992, Carl E. Schneider.
** Professor ofLaw, University of Michigan. This Article is a somewhat altered version of a paper presented at the University of Utah College of Law and Utah Law Reuiew
Symposium on Ethics, Bioethics, and Family Law. An earlier incarnation of that paper
was presented at a conference at the Hastings Center on the Family and Bioethics. I am
grateful to the conferees at both the University and the Hastings Center for their helpful
comments and to both institutions for providing an atmosphere so admirably conducive
to the rational discussion of controversial questions. Finally, I am glad to thank my
colleague Patricia D. White for her insightful responses to an earlier draft of this
manuscript.
For the reasons described in Richard A. Posner, Goodbye to the Bluebook, 53 U Chi
L Rev 1343 (1986), I will adhere to The Uniuersity of Chicago Manual of Legal Citation
(Lawyers Co-Op, 1989). As a great man once said, "Faites simple." I am enthusiastically
grateful to the editors of the Utah Law Reuiew for the uncommonly generous way in
which they have accommodated my wish to strike a blow for freedom from the
formalisms and fatuities-no, the inanities and insanities-of The Bluebook.
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pressing and puzzling issues about what a family is and how it
should and should not be created.
In short, bioethics today confronts ultimate and essential
questions about the ethical and social bases of family life. My task
here is to ask what bioethics might learn about these troubling
questions from the experience of another field which has wrestled
with them for centuries-family law. I have a second task as well.
This is, after all, a symposium on family law, and I hope that I
might make myself useful to that field by providing in brief form
and with concrete illustrations a taxonomy and survey of some of
family law's basic conceptual approaches.
Family law ought to have something to say to bioethics about
these problems. To begin with, many bioethical issues directly
concern family law. For instance, family law seeks to regulate the
situation in which children are created and given families. Many
other bioethical issues deal with matters-like decisions about
medical care-that impinge on family life and that family law has
thus been interested in. More generally, family law has long
experience with a multitude of ethical problems involving the
relations between and the regulation of family members. Family
law therefore should have developed vocabularies and approaches
that could illuminate bioethical problems.
At the very least, we might expect family law to offer
bioethics some concept of the family. Family law ought to have
developed some definition of "family,'• since it needs to know what
it is about a grouping of people that makes a grouping a family.
It ought also to have reached some understanding about what the
moral and social relationships of family members are, so that it
can know what claims they may make on each other and what
duties they owe each other. Such a conception of the family is
surely crucial to both major branches of bioethics, since they deal
precisely with the creation of families and often with the responsibilities of faniily members.
My paper will be divided into several sections, each devoted
to a particular conceptual approach to the problems of family law.
Each section will describe the approach, briefly evaluate its
current status in family law, and then ask what usefulness the
approach might have for bioethical problems. ffitimately I will
820
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argue that family law offers no vocabulary or approach that can
directly and readily be adopted in analyzing bioethical issues. This
conclusion should not be surprising. Family law is law operating
at its outer limits, trying to govern the most ungovernable of
human relationships, seeking to understand the most mysterious
and controversial aspects of sociallife. 1
Yet all this does not mean that bioethics can learn nothing by
looking at family law. On the contrary, there is much to be gained
by looking at the reasons for family law's conceptual limits and
practical constraints; for those reasons reveal something about the
claims, conflicts, and contradictions that make bioethical questions
so painful and contemporary family law so problematic.
IT. MORAL DISCOURSE

By definition, bioethical problems raise moral issues. What
kind of discourse about moral issues does family law use and how
might that discourse be recruited to deal witb. bioethical issues?
Until recently, we might plausibly have tried to answer that
question, since over the preceding century family law had
developed a tolerably clear definition of the family and a reasonably coherent body of beliefs about the relations among family
members and the purposes of family life. That definition and those
beliefs had a fairly well understood moral basis, they were
articulated in moral terms, and they required courts to analyze
many individual cases at least partly in moral language. In the
last two or three decades, however, family law has increasingly
eschewed moral discourse. That is, there has been (with some
exceptions) growing reluctance to have the law serve expressly
moral goals, to articulate legal principles in moral terms, and to
have courts analyze problems in moral language. Simultaneously,
many moral decisions have been transferred from the law to the

1. For an investigation of these features of family law, see Carl E. Schneider, The
Next Step: Definitwn, Generalization, and Theory in American Family Law, 18 U Mich
J L Ref 1039 (1985).
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people the law once sought to regulate. 2 No-fault divorce exemplifies this trend:
[B]efore no-fault divorce, a court discussed a petition for
divorce in moral terms; after no-fault divorce, such a petition
_did not have to be discussed in moral terms. Before no-fault
divorce, the law stated a view of the moral prerequisites to
divorce; after no-fault diyorce, the law is best seen as stating
no view on the subject. Before no-fault divorce, the law
retained for itself much of the responsibility for the moral
choice whether to divorce; after no-fault, most of that responsibility was transferred to the husband and wife. 3

The waning of moral discourse in family law has a number
of causes, including the doctrine of family autonomy,4 the tradition of liberal individualism, a series of modern upheavals in
moral beliefs, the constitutionalization of family law, and the
medicalization-especially the "psychologization"-ofsocial issues.
But several of the trend's most central causes can be summarized
by the phrase "the standards problem." An important justification
for the doctrine of family autonomy has long been that people
disagree about how families ought to be organized and run and
that those disagreements often reduce to unresolvable disputes
over unverifiable l?eliefs. Americans have grown increasingly
sensitive to cultural and individual variations in views on these
subjects and have increasingly felt that society should not impose
its standards on people, particularly where those standards affect
people's intimate relations. For all these reasons, it is increasingly
felt that standards for governing family relations cannot and
should not be written.

2. For a full statement of this hypothesis, see Carl E. Schneider, Moral Discourse
and the Transformation of American Family Law, 83 Mich L Rev 1803 (1985). In that
Article, as here, I argue only that the developments I describe are a trend, not a fully
accomplished fact. For a (partial) normative evaluation of the trend, see Carl E.
Schneider, Rethinking Alimony: Marital Decisions and Moral Discourse, 1991 BYU L Rev
197, 233-57. For characteristically thoughtful comments on the trend, see Lee E.
Teitelbaum, Moral Discourse and Family Law, 84 Mich L Rev 430 (1985).
3. Schneider, 83 Mich L Rev at 1810 (cited in note 2).
4. This is the standard principle offamily law that the state ought wherever possible
to refrain from "intervening'' in the family. For a discussion of what "intervention" might
mean, see Schneider, 1991 BYU L REV at 235-43 (cited in note 2).
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What consequences do the diminution in moral discourse and
the standards problem which partly underlies it have for family
law's usefulness to bioethics? One consequence has been that a
plausible (if not always optimal) means of resolving such questions-directly addressing the moral issue presented by the
bioethical issue-is made less attractive or is even foreclosed. Roe
v. Wade exemplifies this point in two ways. First, Roe's holding
largely removed from the law's purview the issue qf the morality
of abortion in general and of any individual's abortion in particular. Second, the opinion's reasoning expressly sought to reach a
conclusion without discussing the morality of abortion. Less
dramatically, the diminution in moral discourse and the standards
problem have meant that family law's cupboard is increasingly
bare of moral concepts of the family that might inform discussions
of such bioethical dilemmas as surrogate-mother agreements and
of the role families should play in making medical decisions for ·
their incompetent members.5 There is in fact some evidence that
courts directly confronting bioethical problems have sought to do
so without embarking on moral inquiries. AB Allen Buchanan
notes, for instance, 11From Quinlan on, the courts have attempted
to avoid the fundamental philosophical and constitutional .issues
raised by the task of developing a more adequate concept of the
person and hence of the death of a person. 116
For us, however, the most momentQus consequence of the
trend away from moral discourse in the law and of the unremitting prominence of the standards problem has been that the law
is more and more driven to find ways around the standards
problem. That is, the law has increasingly had to ask, if we cannot
directly address the moral aspects of the issues we face, what
other ways can we find of analyzing and resolving them? The rest
of this paper will examine some of the leading alternatives.

5. It is worth observing that there are institutional differences in the willingness to
engage in moral discourse. Such discourse is likeliest to occur in legislatures, partly
because the need to write statutes and pressure from constituents and interest groups
often bring moral issues to the fore.
6. Allen E. Buchanan, The Limits of Proxy Decision-Making, in Rolf Sartorius, ed,
Paternalism 153 (U Minn Press, 1983).

824

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[1992: 819

III. THE PROTECTIVE FuNCTION
One way out of the dilemmas caused by the diminution of
moral discourse and by the standards problem has been to justify
governmental action in terms of one of family law's least controversial enterprises-the protective function. That function
effectuates the law's duty to protect citizens against the various
harms that might befall them, and particularly to protect them
from injuries done them by other citizens.7 Moral discourse in
family law is presently strongest and the standards problem is
presently weakest in those areas where it can be said that the law
is protecting someone who cannot protect himself, who is helpless
against a more powerful person. Thus some of the topics in family
law most often discussed today in moral terms are spouse abuse,
child abuse, and child support. In other words, the protective
function can sometimes seem uncontroversial enough or pressing
enough to escape some of the strictures of the standards problem.
family law's protective function might seem to offer useful
approaches at least to some bioethical problems. Thus it is
sometimes said that surrogate-mother contracts ought to be
prohibited in the interest of protecting surrogates from the pains
of having to give up a child who is (often) genetically theirs and
(always) gestationally theirs. And thus it is sometimes suggested
that the ability of parents to refuse medical treatment for their
defective newborn infants ought to be supervised and superseded
in order to protect those infants.
But the protective function is subject to (at least) four generic
problems which, in bioethics as in family law, will often prove
disabling. The first is that protection easily degenerates into
paternalism: It will often seem improper to protect people who do
not want protection or who even actively resist it. It was this fear,
for example, that in important part motivated Justice Brennan's
dissent in Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health. 8 He

7. For an extended treatment of the protective function, see Carl E. Schneider,
Family Law: Cases and Materials (West, forthcoming 1993).
8. 58 USLW 4916 (1990). Nancy Cruzan was a young woman who had fallen into a
persistent vegetative state after an automobile accident. Her parents sought to have the
hospital in which she lay discontinue her food and water. A Missouri statute, however,
required anyone asking that food and water be withheld from a patient in a persistent
vegetative state show by clear and convincing evidence that that withdrawal was what
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argued that the state was protecting Nancy C:ruzan's life, but that
she found that life a burden, wished to end it, and was entitled to
do so.9 Similarly, a blanket prohibition of surrogate-mother
contracts could be justified as protecting women from the misery
of losing children they had borne and wished to keep. But such a
prohibition would be regarded by many prospective surrogates as
an undue interference with their liberty and an inaccurate
reflection on their ability to make decisions for themselves.
A second generic problem of the protective function is that it
will not always be clear what 11protection11 in a given case means.
Was Nancy Cruzan being protected by the state; which wished to
preserve her life, or by her parents, who wished to save her from
what her life had become? Would statutes prohibiting abortion
protect the lives of unborn children? Or does Roe v. Wade protect
pregnant women from the dangers of abortion statutes? As these
questions are intended to suggest, attempts to serve the protective
function can return us to the standards problem and to its
underlying issues about what makes life good, matters as to which
answers are obscure and agreement is elusive.
The protective function's third characteristic problem-is that,
in trying to protect people from one harm, the state-because it is
large, complex, cumbersome, and obliged to follow rules that must
often be broadly phrased and inflexibly interpreted-will sometimes, perhaps frequently, injure people in unanticipated ways.
Worse, the injured people can easily be those the law is most
anxious to help. For instance, we might want to judicialize medical
decisions in order to protect patients from improvident decisions
to terminate treatment. But the classic defect of such judicialization is that it imposes painful burdens in time, trouble, expense,
and misery on doctors, nurses, families, and, what is worst, on the
patients themselves.
The fourth generic problem with the protective function is
that sometimes the law cannot safeguard all the people who may
seem to need help because their interests conflict. In a surrogatemother case, do you protect the surrogate, whose deep attachment
the patient would have wanted. The Missouri courts held that Cruzan)s parents had not
made such a showing. The United States Supreme Court held that nothing in the United
States Constitution prevented Missouri from imposing such a requirement. I discuss
Cruzan and the rights thinking that undergirds it in some detail in Part VI.
9. ld at 4926-34 (Brennan dissenting).
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to her child is threatened? Do you protect th~ contracting parent,
for whom surrogacy may be the only way of having a biologically
related child and who has nurtured months of expectations and
hopes? Do you protect the infant, the one person in the story who
cannot speak for himself?
In sum, the flaw of the protective function as a path of escape
from the standards problems is that it works best in the easy
cases. In poorly explored and daunting areas like the bioethical
conflicts we are discussing, resorting to the protective function as
justification is likely only to force us back to those moral questions
we had hoped to escape.
IV. OFFICIAL DISCRETION

When the law finds itself unable to write standards, it often
transfers decisions to the discretion of an official or a judge. T;hls
is an old technique in the law generally, and for excellent reasons.
Courts and bureaucracies often need flexibility to adjust their
decisions to the world's complexity. Judges and administrators are
frequently accorded discretion because would-be rule makers
realize that they cannot anticipate all the circumstances in which
they might wish a rule to be applied, because they hope that
judges will be well-situated to construct rules by accretion as they
gain experience deciding cases in an area, and simply because rule
makers find they Cannot agree on a rule. 10
At:cording judges discretion is, of course, a recurring familylaw technique for avoiding direct confrontations with the standards problem. A particularly vivid example of the technique in
that field is the law of child custody, which uses the markedly
discretionary criterion of the child's 11 best interest. 11 It is a technique which has found fresh favor in the law governing the
allocation of a couple's property on divorce, in which courts may
now be directed to divide the spouses' property 11equitably. 11
Despite the regularity with which family law has substituted
discretion for standards, the technique is not in good odor in the
field. Virtually every major. figure in the field has condemned

10. For a more extensive survey of the merits and demerits of rules and discretion,
see Carl E. Schneider, Rules and Discretion: A Lawyer's View, in Keith Hawkins, ed, The
Uses of Discretion (Oxford U Press, forthcoming 1993).
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child-custody law's best-interest standard as deplorably indeterminate.11 Equitable distribution simpliciter is not well-established
and is currently under attack. Federal law now calls for mechanical guidelines to replace discretionary awards of child support. And
there is notable sentiment in favor of substituting elaborately
specific criteria for intervention in families in child-abuse-andneglect cases for the old and discretionary intervene-whenever-it'snecessary standard.
The reasons official discretion is unloved in family law largely
apply to bioethics. These reasons are too familiar to bear prolonged
reiteration here, since they are the standard objections to discretion. They include the arguments that discretion allows officials
and judges to let their prejudices affect their decisions, that
discretion leads to inconsistent decisions, and that discretionary
standards give affected parties insufficient guidance about what
the law expects of them or will do to them. Further, granting
officials and judges discretion solves the standards problem only
in the sense of relieving a legislature of the tasks of formulating,
articulating, and getting the votes to enact standards. After all, an
official or judge must base a decision on some kind of principle,
even if it is unarticulated or even unconscious. Discretion does not
eliminate the question whether the principle chosen is a good one
and whether it is right to hold people to it rather than allowing
them to choose for themselves how to behave. These kinds of
problems with discretion may be made more concrete by imagining
what the Court's reaction to confiding a decision in Cruzan to the
unfettered discretion of a judge or official would have been. Many
of the Justices, at least, would have protested that such a rule
grievously violates a patient's rights to decide what care to receive
and to enjoy the benefits of due process.12 Thus, while awarding
11. For two first-rate examples of those criticisms, see Robert H. Mnookin, ChildCustody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face of Indeterminacy, L & Contemp
Probs 226 (Summer 1975); David L. Chambers, Rethinking the Substantive Rules for
Custody Disputes in Divorce, 83 Mich L Rev 477 (1984). For a critical review of those
criticisms and ·a cautious and constrained defense of discretion, see Carl E. Schneider,
Discretion, Rules, and Law: Child Custody and the UMDA's Best-Interest Standard, 89
Mich L Rev 2215 (1991).
12. There are, however, many forms of official discretion, and it is often extremely
difficult to formulate rules for resolving complex problems without confiding a good deal
of discretion in some official. The opinions in Cruzan generally seem to contemplate that,
at least in many instances, a court would have to decide whether an incompetent patient
would have wanted treatment terminated. Given the probable quality of evidence in
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grants of discretion may in fact be a good way of handling many
bioethical problems, family law is at best uneasy authority for that
conclusion.
V. FAMILY AUTHORITY
If the state cannot promulgate standards, and if it cannot
finesse the problem away by giving officials or judges discretion,
it must transfer decisions to someone else. As I said earlier in my
discussion of moral discourse, this is exactly what family law has
tried to do. Even before the "transformation" of family law,
numerous decisions were assigned to "the family." Thus courts
have long refused to resolve many kinds of disputes between
family members on the grounds that families ought to be encouraged to work out their own problems in their own way. And thus
states have long confided responsibility for most decisions about
children to their parents.
The application of this view to a number of bioethical issues
is obvious and appealing. Some of the bioethical decisions associated with reproduction already have been or might plausibly be
resolved by referring them to the family. Thus decisions about the
morality of an abortion have been transferred to the pregnant
woman, in part with the expectation (but not compulsion) that she
will share that decision with the father. Decisions about medical
care for incompetents are, at least in practice, often made by the
patient's family, 13 and many people believe, as the dissents in
Cruzan indicate, that this is right and proper. 14 Nevertheless,
family law's experience suggests some difficulties with solving the
standards problem by deferring to "the family."

many of these cases, this is a decision which it will often be impossible to make without
a considerable exercise of discretion.
13. See, for example, Stewart B. Levine, et al, Informed Consent in the Electroconuulsiue Treatment of Geriatric Patients, 19 Bul Am Acad Psych L 395 (1991); Clara C. Pratt,
et al,Autonomy and Decision Making Between Single Older Women and Their Caregiuing
Daughters, 29 Gerontologist 792 (1989). In practical fact, of course, the family's power
is, at best, shared with physicians. For an illuminating investigation of the relationship
between doctors and families in medical decisions, see Robert Zussman, lntensiue Care:
Medical Ethics and the Medical Profession (U Chi Press, 1992).
14. For an influential statement of this position, see Nancy K Rhoden, Litigating
Life and Death, 102 Harv L Rev 375 (1988).
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Perhaps the most basic of these difficulties is that the
conceptual basis for this deference has been eroded in recent
years. Traditionally, as I suggested a moment ago, the law
assumed that family members are united by bonds of mutual
concern so strong that the law could and should treat each family
as a whole and not just as a collection of individual family
members.15 Thus the law was willing to have family members
make decisions for each other and even (as I suggested above) to
insist that decisions be made within families rather than by
courts.
Increasingly, however, courts and commentators have
attacked this view of the family. To some critics, deferring to "the
family" really means confirming the power of its most powerful
member.16 To some of these critics, such deference simply affirms
the patriarchal principle. To others, it denies the rights and
personhood of children. To still others, it threatens the autonomy
and self-sufficiency of all members of the family. Yet other critics
find the entity view simply mistaken, on the reasoning that
families are irreducibly made up of individuals and have no
interests other than those of their members. Finally, critics who
are concerned about the standards problem find the entity view
objectionable because it embodies and promotes a normative
ideal-however vague-of the family.
Family law has thus more and more come to regard family
members as individuals who no doubt have important relationships with each other but who should be treated as legally
distinct. As Justice Brennan wrote in a telling and influential
passage, "[T]he marital couple is not an independent entity with
a mind and heart of its own, but an association of two individuals
each with a separate intellectual and emotional makeup.' 117
Professor Hafen describes the new view of the family as contractual. He suggests that families are increasingly united by a merely
contractual solidarity, one whose "main motivation is 'purposive,

15. For a thoughtful statement of this view, see Bruce C. Hafen, The Family as an
Entity, 22 UC Davis L Rev 865 (1989).
16. See, for example, Lee E. Teitelbaum, Family History and Family Law, 1985 Wis
L Rev 1135; Frances E. Olsen, The Myth of State Intervention in the Family, 18 U Mich
J L Ref 835 (1985). For comments on this view, see Schneider, BYU L Rev at 235-43
(cited in note 2).
17. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 US 438, 453 (1972).
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implicitly egoistic, utilitarian,' and lacking in a 'sense of sociocultural oneness of the parties.' Each party typically enters the
relationship 'for his own sake, uniting with the other party only so
far as this provides him with an advantage (profit, pleasure, or
service)."'18
The law now recognizes the individuality of family members
in a variety of ways. For example, no-fault divorce, by making
divorce available on demand, forswears any legal effort to hamper
each spouse's ability to leave the family. Family law has increasingly allowed spouses (and unmarried cohabitants) to contract
with each other. The ever-more-common practice of appointing
lawyers to represent children in cases-like custody or medicalcare proceedings-in which their parents are litigants further
recognizes the legal separateness of family members and the
possible (or even presumptive?) adversity of their interests.19 This
pattern similarly presents itself in cases raising bioethical issues.
Bellotti v. Baird!-0 makes one important kind of decision-whether a child should have an abortion-essentially a decision for the
child alone, and not one for the family. 21 Planned Parenthood of
Central Missouri v. Danforth22 makes the wife's decision whether
to have an abortion one she may make without obtaining her
husband's consent.23
We have looked at the way family law has tried to escape the
standards problem by referring decisions to the family. But, I have
been arguing, the standards problem itself (at least in some of its
more sweeping versions) undercuts the basis for any such referral.

18. Hafen, 22 UC Davis L Rev at 895-96 (cited in note 15.)
19. See, for example, Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 US 110 (1989), where a wife
allegedly bore the child of a man other than her husband. Id at 113-14. The child's
putative natural father sued to be declared the legal father. Id at 118. When the child
was a little less than two years old, the court appointed a lawyer to represent her. Id at
114. When the Supreme Court decided the case the child was slightly over eight years
old, and she was still represented by counsel. Id at 130-32. For an examination of the
case in light of the state's interest in the family as an entity, see Carl E. Schneider, The
Channelling Function in Family Law, 20 Hofstra L Rev 495 (forthcoming 1992). For
investigations of the problems posed when lawyers represent clients who cannot speak
for themselves, see Robert H. Mnookin, et al, In the Interest of Children: Advocacy, Law
Reform, and Public Policy (WH Freeman & Co, 1985); and Carl E. Schneider, Lawyers
and Children: Wisdom and Legitimacy in Family Policy, 84 Mich L Rev 919 (1986).
20. 443 us 622 (1979).
21. Id at 643-44.
22. 428 us 52 (1976).
23. Id at 69.
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The referral is best justified by a moral view of the family that
makes it an appropriate decision maker. The law once accepted
such a view. Now, partly because of the standards problem, it is
disinclined to do so. Thus the rationale for deferring to the family
is markedly weakened. 24
The problem with referring bioethical decisions to the family
is not just that the basis for such a referral has been eroded. It is
also that, unless "family" is quite broadly defined, some number
of people will have no family to which a decision can be referred
(and even if it is broadly defined, some people will still not have
a family able and willing to take on the burden of their bioethical
decisions). For example, within the ordinary understanding of the
law, a single adult like Nancy Cruzan25 has been emancipated
from her family, so that her parents can no longer make decisions
for her. But why not simply define Nancy Cruzan's family to.
include her parents? In her case, and in many cases, that is no
doubt the right thing to do. But whatever the wisdom of defining
"family" broadly in particular cases, family law may hesitate to do
so when writing generally applicable rules. Let us ask why.
The family to which decisions are ordinarily referred is
essentially the nuclear family. 26 Within it are two kinds of
relationships. There are special reasons to expect people in each
of these relationships to make good decisions for each other. The
first relationship is marital. Husbands and wives should make
good decisions for each other because they have confided special
love and trust in each other. The second relationship is parental.
Parents should make good decisions for their children because of
the perhaps-instinctual feelings oflove, concern, and responsibility
parents have for their young children. The quality of both kinds of
decisions should be enhanced where families live in households:
People who are committed to living intimately together for ma,ny

24. I use "weakened" advisedly. The entity view of the family retains many
adherents even in the remotenesses of academe. See, for example, Hafen, 22 UC Davis
L Rev (cited in note 15). It is probably the conventional wisdom among much of the rest
of the country. See Carl E. Schneider, State-Interest Analysis in Fourteenth Amendment
"Privacy" Law: An Essay on the Constitutionalization of Social Issues, L & Contemp
Probs 79, 107-110 (Winter 1988). And even people who reject it will still often find
reasons in particular cases to prefer familial to governmental decisions.
25. It appears that her marriage ended sometime after her accident. Cruzan, 58
USLW at 4917.
26. See, for example, Michael H., 491 US at 117-30.
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years should act wisely for each other because they come to know
each other deeply and because their interests become so richly
intertwined.27
Of course, parents are still, today as yesterday, bound by ties
of blood, love, and experience to their adult children. But more and
more, American society expects parents to raise their children to
develop. their own values, to leave their parents' homes, to
establish their own householCls, to lead their own lives. 11Therefore
shall a man leave his father and his mother, and shall cleave unto
his wife: and they shall be one flesh. 1128 Partly in pursuit of that
goal, family law has increasingly promoted the autonomy of minor
children. A fortiori, will it not promote the autonomy of adult
children?29 If the idea that parents of an adult child should not
be legally· considered part of the child's family seems plainly
wrong, consider the cases we now sometimes see in which parents
of an incompetent adult contend with his homosexual lover for the
power to make decisions for him.
I have been discussing the problems with broadening the
definition of family in its easiest form-to include parents of adult
27. This argument, however, should not be pushed too far. There is evidence that
many people do not discuss their preferences about medical care with their families. See,
for example, Dallas M. High, All in the Family: Extended Autonomy and Expectations in
Surrogate Health Care Decision-Making, 28 Gerontologist 46 (Supp 1988); Bernard Lo,
et al, Patient Attitudes to Discussing Life-Sustaining Treatment, 146 Archives Internal
Med 1613 (1986). Worse, there is some direct reason to doubt that families in fact
accurately learn their members' preferences about medical care from living with them.
See, for example, Tom Tomlinson, et al, An Empirical Study ofProxy Consent for Elderly
Persons, 30 Gerontologist 54 (1990); Joseph G. Ouslander, et al, Health Care Decisions
Among Elderly Long-Term Care Residents and Their Potential Proxies, 149 Archives
Internal Med 1367 (1989); Allison B. Seckler, et al, Substituted Judgment: How Accurate
Are Proxy Predictions?, 115 Annals Internal Med 92 (1991); Richard F. Uhlmann, et al,
Physicians' and Spouses' Predictions of Elderly Patients' Resuscitation Preferences, 43 J
Gerontology M115 (1988).
Despite all this, there is also evidence that people generally prefer that their
families participate in making medical decisions while they are competent and make
medical decisions for them when they cannot do so themselves. See, for example,
Madelyn A. Iris, Guardianship and the Elderly: A Multi-Perspective View of the
Decisionmaking Process, 28 Gerontologist 39 (Supp 1988); Dallas M. High and Howard
B. Turner, Surrogate Decision-Making: The Elderly's Familial Expectations, 8 Theoretical
Med 303 (1987).
28. Genesis 2:24. See Leslie Francis, The Roles of the Family in Making Health Care
Decisions for Incompetent Patients, 1992 Utah L Rev 861.
29. For insightful reflections on the autonomy and responsibility of adult children,
see Lee E. Teitelbaum, Intergenerational Responsibility and Family Obligation: On
Sharing, 1992 Utah L Rev 765; Hilde L. Nelson and James L. Nelson, Frail Parents,
Robust Duties, 1992 Utah L Rev 747.
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children. All these problems worsen when we consider broadening
the definition to include people unrelated by blood. What may we
infer from family law's experience with this problem? The law has
become more willing to treat as a "family" a group of people whose
relationship performs the functions that a traditional family
performs. Thus Marvin v. Marvin80 offers protections to people
leaving non-marital cohabitation that resemble those offered to
people ending marriages.31 And thus Braschi v. Stahl Associates82 treats a homosexual couple as a family for purposes of New
York City's rent control program.33
But this "functional equivalence" approach has its difficulties
and drawbacks. Thus courts have hesitated to extend Marvin's
principle to reach other ways of treating cohabitants like spouses.
They have done so for reasons that are relevant to our inquiry.
Marriage represents a specially serious and binding commitment
two people make to each other. That commitment forms the basis
for treating spouses in special ways. Of course, people don't have
to marry in order to make such commitments, and some unmarried couples may be as deeply and solidly bound as any husband
and wife. But unless people go through the public affirmation of
the commitment that marriage constitutes, the law cannot know
that they have made it. The law could, of course, inquire into the
quality of each non-marital commitment to see whether it met
"marital standards." And indeed Marvin calls for just such
inquiries.34 But they seem a distasteful invasion of privacy. Nor
is it clear what standards and evidence would be used in evaluating the quality of a commitment.
In addition, there is a slippery-slope problem, a problem
created by the way common-law courts tend to use precedent.
Marriage, I have been arguing, provides what lawyers call a
bright-line rule. It is easy to tell when a couple is married, and the
law treats them as married whatever the true nature of their

30. 557 P2d 106 (Cal 1976).
31. Id at 116, 122-23.
32. 543 NE2d 49 (NY 1989).
33. Id at 53-55.
34. The Maruin court anticipated investigations into whether the parties' sexual
relations were a severable part of their contract, into whether the parties had tried to
avoid a marital relationship, and into any facts that might form the basis for any kind
of equitable relief.
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emotional relationship is. But once a court starts asking whether
a non-marital relationship is the functional equivalent ofmarriage,
it starts a process in which it compares the case at hand with the
weakest case in which a couple has been found to have achieved
the functional equivalent of marriage. The case at hand will sometimes seem just close enough to the weakest precedent to justify
saying that it qualifies as the functional equivalent of marriage.
That case then becomes a precedent, and the process begins again.
The process is partly driven by the dynamics of our system of
precedent. And it is accelerated by the fear that to refuse to call
a relationship the equivalent of marriage is to deny its importance
to the parties and is thus to demean the relationship.
Why might this process be a problem? At the end of the day
lies the risk that extending the regime of functional equivalents
will tend to assimilate relatively transient and shallow relationships to marriage. Yet the usefulness of marriage as a social
institution depends in significant part on people's understanding
that it is special, and that it is special in the seriousness of
commitment that it demands. The risk, ih other words, is that
extending the regime of functional equivalents will erode the
special qualities of marriage and reduce marriage to just one more
11
life style choice. 1135
This brings us to our next reservation about functionalequivalence approach. Marriage is not just an outward sign of
inward commitment. It is a social and legal institution which
reinforces that commitment. People who marry assume a role
which carries social expectations with it, expectations most people
have to some degree internalized and which are not avoided
without cost. This increases the likelihood-although only the
likelihood-that the quality of the relationship justifies according
one member the power to make momentous decisions for the
other.36
I have been discussing some of the knotty problems of
definition that would need to be untied before deference to family
authority could be fully useful in solving bioethical problems. But

35. For more complete comments on the "functional-equivalence" approach, see
Schneider, 20 Hofstra L Rev (cited in note 19).
36. For an extended exposition of the role and value of social institutions in the
familial realm, see id.
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there is a final problem with deferring to the family, however it is
de:fined. 37 Many of the bioethical decisions we might ask families
to make are enormously consequential. They are literally questions
of life and death. Yet two factors (at least) can make it hard for
people in intimate relationships to decide them wisely. First, love
is not the only strong feeling to which intimacy gives rise. Love
can be mixed with equally potenfbut harsher feelings of jealousy,
resentment, and even hate. Second, people in such relationships
may have conflicts of interest that inhibit dispassion and diminish
wisdom. Those conflicts include even the crassest kind ofwish that
one's relative should die so that one can receive an inheritance.38
Less drastically and more sympathetically, they include concerns
that one relative's lingering illness is damaging the well-being of
37. Of course, family law has not burdened itself by trying to adopt a single
definition of the family. Rather, it has adopted different definitions for different
purposes.
38. This is, as I say, the crassest way in which a family member's decisions might
be distorted. But that does not mean that only the crassest people will be influenced by
it. Archdeacon Grantly is not a bad man, but it is only after ''he thought long and sadly,
in deep silence, and then gazed at that still living face" that he "at last dared to ask
himself whether he really longed for his father's death" so that he might be appointed
to his father's bishopric. Anthony Trollope, Barchester Towers 12 {Doubleday, nd). In
addition to the fact of this distorting motive is the fear that it arouses. Prince Hal
apparently is speaking the truth when he explains that he took the crown from his
father's pillow because "I never thought to hear you speak again." But the king retorts,
Thy wish was father, Harry, to that thought:
I stay too long by thee, I weary thee.
Dost thou so hunger for mine empty chair
That thou wilt needs invest thee with my honours
Before they hour be ripe?
And he has already expostulated:
See, sons, what things you are!
How quickly nature falls into revolt
When gold becomes her object!
For this the foolish over-careful fathers
Have broke their sleep with thoughts, their brains with
care,
Their bones with industry;
For this they have engrossed and piled up
The canker'd heaps of strange-achieved gold;
For this they have been thoughtful to invest
Their sons with arts and martial exercises:
When, like the bee, culling from every flower
The virtuous sweets,
Our thighs pack'd with wax, our mouths with honey,
We bring it to the hive; and, like the bees,
Are murder'd for our pains.
William Shakespeare, The Second Part of King Henry the Fourth, act IV, sc. v.
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other family members. Such concerns presumably contributed to
the majority's reluctance in Cruzan simply to hand over treatment
decisions to the family. 39 And such concerns have helped motivate
family law's long-standing reluctance to cede families complete
control over decisions for their members. It is worth remembering,
for example, that the law of child abuse requires parents to
provide needed medical care for their children, and that the
criminal law is in principle prepared to punish as homicide any
failure to do so that results in a child's death. 40
Obviously, I am not arguing that families should not participate in making bioethical decisions for their members. My
inclinations are quite to the contrary. But I think that the lesson
of family law's experience is once again cautionary. Familial
decisions can be acutely troublesome and troubling. Writing rules
to govern such decisions is not without its complexities and even
its dangers. Further, the atomizing tendencies of the age and its
law-the ever-sharpening urge to treat family members as
independent of each other-conflict harshly with the desire to
confide crucial bioethical decisions to families. In short, what we
have been calling 11family authority., offers only partial and
problematic solutions to the kinds of bioethical issues we are
discussing.
VI. RIGHTS DISCOURSE
Yet another common and conventional answer to the
standards problem is to analyze issues in terms of rights. 41
Rights solutions confer on rights holders the power to resolve
ethical questions and thereby relieve the state of the burden of
doing so. Since rights thinking is one of the dominant modes of
39. See Cruzan, 58 USLW at 4922. The Court also noted that "there is no automatic
assurance that the view of close family members will necessarily be the same as the
patient's would have been had she been confronted with the prospect of her situation
while competent." Id.
40. For a challenging and illuminating illustration of the difficulty of family decisions
in even the most benign circumstances, see John Hardwig, The Problem of Proxies With
Interests of Their Own: Toward a Better Theory ofProxy Decisions, 1992 Utah L Rev 803.
41. When I say "rights discourse," I will be referring primarily to the discourse about
constitutional rights in the United States today. For an analysis of that discourse and
its use in family law, see Carl E. Schneider, Rights Discourse and Neonatal Euthanasia,
76 Cal L Rev 151 (1988). For an extended critical treatment of American rights
discourse, see Mary Ann Glendon, Rights Talk (Free Press, 1991).
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discourse in America today, it should be no surprise that there are
few areas of family law which someone has not suggested should
be constitutionalized, and that there are not a few-entry into
marriage, reproductive freedom, parental rights, and some aspects
of child custody, for instance-which have been.
Rights solutions have seemed attractive in both areas of
bioethics. Roe v. Wade obviously has something-often a great
deal-to say about bioethical issues related to reproduction. And
many of the questions about how medical-care decisions should be
made have been analyzed in terms of rights, as the opinions in the
Cruzan case suggest. Too many people (including me) have written
too often and too long about Roe v. Wade to justify another inquiry
into what it teaches about the usefulness of rights discourse. But
we may learn something about three systematic problems with
that discourse by looking more generally at family law's experience
with it.
The first of these systematic problems is that 11the origin,
scope, justification, and purpose11 of many of the constitutional
rights at issue in family law cases are uncertain. 42 The rights at
stake are generally what are loosely called 11 privacy11 rights. These
rights are essentially of recent origin, and the textual basis for
them is slight. The case law through which they have been
developed has not always labored to explore their nature or
rationale. This is troubling on the familiar principle that in a
democratic society courts, as non-majoritarian institutions, should
not thwart decisions of majoritarian institutions without wellfounded, well-articulated authority.43 But it is also troubling at
a more practical level. To see why, we need to understand
something about how the Supreme Court analyzes family-law
rights. The Court has commonly denominated most of these rights
11
fundamental, 11 and it has (albeit somewhat erratically) imposed on
any statute with which these rights conflict a generally unbearable
burden of justification. Thus the question whether a litigant can

42. Schneider, 76 Cal L Rev at 158 (cited in note 41).
43. One of the unfortunate problems with rights discourse is that its underlying
principles are-reasonably enough, under the circumstances-poorly understood by even
quite sophisticated publics. It now seems to be true that a dismaying number of people
simply expect the Supreme Court to put into law desirable social policy, not to interpret
the Constitution. For a particularly sympathetic but still dismaying example of this
confusion, see Pete Busalacchi, How Can They?, Hastings Center Rep 6 (Sept/Oct 1990).
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assert a right is crucial. Yet because of its uncertainty about the
nature of these rights, the Court has regularly had difficulty
answering that question coherently and predictably.
The second systematic problem with family-law rights
analysis lies in its difference from most other rights discourse.
Ordinarily, we talk in terms of what I have called the Mill
paradigm: 11That is, we think in terms of the state's regulation of
a person's actions. In such conflicts, we are predisposed to favor
the person, out of respect for his moral autonomy and human
dignity. 1144 That predisposition also rests on our assumption that
the state can bear any risks of an incorrect decision better than
the individual can. 11In family law, however, the Mill paradigm
often breaks down, because in family law conflicts are often not
between a person and the state but between one person and
another person. 1145 For example, we say that parents have a right
to make decisions for their children. Yet we also say children have
a right to life. If parents decide to deny their children treatment
necessary to save their lives, how are we to choose between the
two rights?
The third systematic problem with rights discourse in family
law has been its inability to deal convincingly with the interests
the state asserts to justify its infringement of rights. The Court
often says that where a 11fundamental 11 right is at stake, a statute
must be 11necessary11 to serve a 11compelling11 state interest. But in
practice the Court has been unwilling to apply this standard
consistently or to define the standard's terms comprehensibly. In
large part, this is probably because the test essentially requires
the Court to compare two incommensurable values-the importance of the right with the importance of the state interest. On
what scale, to take the example of Zablocki v. Redhail,46 do you
weigh the right of a person to marry against the state's interest in
assuring that parents will support their childrenr7

44. Schneider, 76 Cal L Rev at 157 (cited in note 41).
45. ld.
46. 434 US 374 (1978). In Zablocki, the state had forbidden people to marry who
already had children they could not or would not support. ld at 375.
47. For detailed criticisms of the Court's state-interest analysis in family-law cases,
see Schneider, L & Comtemp Probs, at 79 (cited in note 24); and Carl E. Schneider,
State-Interest Analysis and the Channelling Function in Privacy Law, in Stephen
Gottlieb, ed, Public Values in Constitutional Law (Mich U Press, forthcoming 1993).
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These three problems with rights ~scourse will often infect
attempts to analyze bioethical issues in rights terms, if only
because of the considerable overlap between family law and
bioethics. Let us briefly examine some of the ways in which this
happens by looking at the recent and familiar case of Cruzan v.
Director, Missouri Department of Health. 48 The first of the problems of rights thinking we discussed was the obscurity of the
origins, scope, justification, and purpose of family-law rights. I
would suggest that such uncertainties about the nature of the
right at stake in Cruzan explain much of the disagreement
between the majority opinion and Justice Brennan's dissent.
Justice Brennan vehemently insisted that Nancy Cruzan had ·a
right to decide whether to receive food and water. But as· the
majority noted, 11 The difficulty with [that] claim is that in a sense
it begs the question: an incompetent person is not able to make an
informed and voluntary choice to exercise a hypothetical right to
refuse treatment or any other right. 1149
The importance of Cruzan's incompetence lies in the nature
of the right asserted for her. It is a right to decide. If we ask why
we might attribute such a right to people, we are likely to suggest
two reasons. The first is that people will make better decisions for
themselves than the state can, since they know their own situation
better than the state and have every incentive to make a more·
careful decision than the state would. But this rationale did not
apply in Cruzan, since Nancy Cruzan could not know anything or
respond to any incentives. The second reason we might attribute
such rights to people is 11out of respect for their status as independent moral agents. 1150 But once again there is a problem with this
basis for the privacy right in Cruzan, since 11it makes little sense
to attribute rights to people who cannot be independent moral
agents. 1151 The dissents needed, then, to explain why the origin

48. For a statement of the facts of Cruzan, see note 8. For an extended treatment
of the case as a social, moral, and political question, see Carl E. Schneider, Cruzan and
the Constitutionalization ofAmerican Life, 17 J Med & Phil (forthcoming 1992). For good
analyses of Cruzan as a constitutional problem, see John A. Robertson, Cruzan and the
Constitutional Status of Nontreatment Decisions for Incompetent Patients, 25 Ga L Rev
1139 (1991); and Yale Kamisar, When is There a Constitutional "Right to Die"? When is
There No Constitutional "Right to Liue"?, 25 Ga L Rev 1203· (1991) ..
49. Cruzan, 58 USLW at 4920.
50. Schneider, 76 Cal L Rev at 165 (cited in note 41).
51. Id.
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and purpose of the right made it applicable to Cruzan. Instead,
they formalistically and dogmatically insisted that she had a right
to decide whatever her ability to claim, comprehend, or exercise it.
Cruzan instantiates the breakdown of the Mill paradigm in
several related ways. First, that paradigm assumes a competent
right-holder, which Nancy Cruzan was not. This might not have
been crucial had she had only one right and had it been incontrovertible that she would have wanted to exercise it. But the second
way in which Cruzan departs from the Mill paradigm is that she
had not just one right, but almost a cacophony of rights, rights
which potentially conflicted. She had a right to life; she had a
right to refuse treatment necessary to preserve her life; she had a
right (Justice Stevens believed) to have a decision made in her
best interests. Finally, there were in her case two sets of potential
right-holders-Nancy Cruzan and her parents. Yet the interests
of the two sets potentially conflicted in the ways I earlier described.52
Finally, underlying much of the debate in Cruzan was the
question how the state's interests should be analyzed. The dissents
essentially argued that the state has no interest in the life of a
person who does not want to live and that therefore the state
cannot require that it be shown by clear and convincing evidence
(instead of a mere preponderance of the evidence) that an
incompetent person wishes to refuse treatment. This, I think,
unduly (and characteristically) depreciates the state's interests.
For one thing, the state has an interest arising out of its protective
function. The evidentiary standard challenged in Cruzan was to be
applied in all cases in which the issue was whether life-sustaining
treatment should be denied an incompetent patient. It may well
be that Nancy Cruzan would have wanted not to be treated in her
circumstances. But I think it is at least constitutionally reasonable
for the state to assume that, while many and perhaps most people
would choose at some point to refuse medical treatment, most
people prefer life to death and will struggle to retain it as long as

52. One way of resolving the potential conflict would be to say that Cruzan's parents
had no distinct rights of their own, but were merely exercising her rights for her.
However, this does not really make the problem go away, since there remain not only the
questions whether her parents in fact had no right of their own and whether a right like
Cruzan's could be exercised by an unappointed proxy but also the fact that her interests
and their interests potentially conflicted.
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they feel they can. On this view, the state protects people who
cannot protect themselves by setting a general evidentiary
standard that errs on the side of treatment.53 This view is made
more plausible by the consideration that the people-the family-who will usually be seeking to end treatment will be people
who will not uncommonly stand to benefit in some way from doing
so. And even when, as will ordinarily be the case, patients
ultimately do not need to be protected from their families, the
state can point out that they may still need to be protected from
the other people who may participate in making decisions about
the patient--namely, the relevant medical personnel.54
53. It is, as the dissents pointed out, no doubt true that Missouri's evidentiary
standard would sometimes result in treatment being given where the patient would not
have wanted it. See, for example, Cruzan, 58 USLW at 4926 (Brennan dissenting). But
as the majority noted, such a result is quite unremarkable in our legal system. Id at
4921. We regularly decline to give effect even to a clearly expressed intention where that
intention has not been given the proper legal form, as the laws of wills, gifts, conveyancing, and contracts (to name only a few) all testify. We do so in part for reasons of
efficiency: Where people have followed the correct legal forms in expressing their wishes,
we are relieved of the burden of ad hoc inquiries into their true intent. But we also do
so because we have the deepest doubts about the success of any such inquiries. In
addition, we impose on people the obligation of making their preferences clear so that
everyone who needs to know can know with confidence what those preferences are.
Finally, we ordinarily decline to enforce preferences that are not expressed in the correct
legal form because of our fear that even a clearly and accurately expressed wish may not
be what the person truly wants. We have all had the experience of thinking that if some
situation arose we would want some particular result, but nevertheless discovering that,
when pressed to make an actual decision, our impulse was not our true wish. For a
moving expression of such a discovery, see Vicki Williams, The Horror Is Worth It,
Newsweek 14 (Oct 9, 1989), a wife's account of how her termin~lly ill husband reversed
his initial decision to refuse aggressive treatment. Less dramatically, see Jay J.J.
Christensen-Szalanski, Discount Functions and the Measurement of Patients' Values:
Women's Decisions During Childbirth, 4 Med Decision Making 47 (1984), which reports
that a significant proportion of women who had chosen to forego analgesics during
childbirth changed their minds during delivery. (It should be said that not all studies of
patient preferences indicate this kind ofinstability. See, for instance, Maria A. Everhart
and Robert A. Pearlman, Stability of Patient Preferences Regarding Life-Sustaining
Treatments, 97 Chest 159 (1990).) The forms and formalities associated with preparing
and signing legal documents are intended to bring home to their signers that a binding
and consequential decision is being made and thus to promote as "true" a decision as
possible.
Part of the problem in Cruzan is probably that Nancy Cruzan was caught in a
transitional period when new legal responses to the problems of incompetent patients are
being created and publicized. It is possible that, as living wills and durable powers of
attorney become more common, people like Cruzan will come to know about them and,
where they want to, sign them. At least at that point it will be more reasonable to expect
people to do so and to deny effect to any wishes they express that are not in a form
clearly announcing that their wishes are intended to have legal effect.
54. On the propensity of some physicians to see treatment issues as exclusively
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In addition, is it true that society has no interest in the lives
of its citizens once they have decided not to live? Suppose, for
instance, that A had irrevocably decided to commit suicide and
had taken poison which would inevitably result in his death.
Suppose further that B then killed A. Is B innocent of homicide
because Ns life has ceased to be of interest to society? Surely not.
B is guilty of homicide partly because of the s~ial interest in
maintaining a sense of the sanctity of human life in order to
encourage people to respect it. But the social interest in Ns life
also arises out of the belief that few things are more basically
important than human life, that it is valuable in itself and not just
to the holder, that "each man's death diminishes me." If there is
a social interest in rocks, louseworts, and snail darters, why not
in people's lives~
In criticizing contemporary rights discourse and in surveying
its limitations, I have not intended to say that rights solutions
should never be sought, that that discourse does not serve
valuable purposes, or that all the problems with our rights
discourse are insuperable. But in America today rights solutions
have so powerful an appeal that the greater danger is that they
will be unreflectively adopted and dogmatically defended. Thus I
have been more concerned here with some of the cautionary
experiences family law has encountered in using rights discourse
than with the well-known advantages that flow from it.
VII. THE FACILITATIVE FuNCTION
Another response to the standards problem has recently
grown ~bundantly in popularity. This response is to expand what
I call the law's "facilitative function." The facilitative function

medical and not at all moral or social, see Allen E. Buchanan, Medical Paternalism or
Legal Imperialism: Not the Only Alternatives for Handling Saikewicz-Type Cases, 5 Am
J L & Med 97 (1979). For a more realistic look than any of the opinions in Cruzan offers
of the actual practice of "informed consent," see B.W. Levin, The Culture and Politics of
"Baby Doe" Decisions, Paper presented at the 108th Annual Spring Meeting of the
American Ethnological Society (1986); and Zussman, Intensive Care (cited in note 13).
55. Justice Scalia's concurring opinion took an even stronger line on the stateinterest question. It argued that what was at stake in the case was whether Cruzan
could commit suicide and that the state's interest in preventing suicide was solidly
established by centuries of statutory and case-law precedent. Cruzan, 58 USLW at 492426 (Scalia concurring).

No.3]

BIOETHICS AND THE FAMILY

843

allows people to deploy the law's power to arrange their lives in
ways they prefer. It has two primary forms. First, it offers people
a legally enforceable way of specifying how their affairs should be
handled, as when it allows them to specify in a will how their
assets will be distributed. Second, it provides people with a legally
enforceable way of arranging their relationships, as when it allows
them to enter into contracts. An attraction of both forms is that
they permit people to choose their own standards, so that the law
need not prescribe standards for them. 56
Family law has long resisted the use of contracts in most
family settings. Recently, however, it has become markedly more
willing to allow couples both before and during marriage to enter
into contracts regulating some of their relations during and after
marriage. And it has also become more welcoming of contracts
between unmarried cohabitants. Nevertheless, family law's
attitude toward contracts remains cautious. Why? For one thing,
family relationships often involve emotive, fluid, and personal
attitudes and behavior that are not consonant with the kinds of
rationalistic and calculating attitudes that we associate with
contract law. For another thing, people in family contexts may be
unable or unwilling to bargain aggressively, to guard against
internal and external emotional pressures, and to foresee far into
the future how they will feel about complex and intractable
problems they cannot now even imagine. Family law's protective
function thus may well call for it to safeguard at least the weaker
party to the contract. Further, many contracts affect people
besides the contracting parties. These people will not have had the
choice of standards the parties to the contract had, and so for
them the facilitative function will not have solved the standards
problem. What is worse, these third parties may be injured by the
contract, thus calling the protective function into play. And, of
course, there is always the awkward fact that many people will
not make a contract despite every incentive to do so, just as many
people will not write a will despite centuries of encouragement and
admonishment. In sum, family law has resisted contract as an
56. For an exploration of the facilitative function and of contract in family law, see
Schneider, Family Law: Cases and Materials (cited in note 7). For a more extended and
favorable view of the use of contract in family law than I offer in this essay, see Maijorie
M. Shultz, Contractual Ordering ofMarriage: A New Model for State Policy, 70 CalL Rev
204, 244-65 (1982).
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ordering principle because of doubts about the appropriateness of
using a commercial mechanism in a personal setting, and families
seem often to share that resistance.
Similar concerns will inhibit solving bioethical problems
through the facilitative function. Consider, for instance, surrogatemother contracts. Can prospective surrogates think with the
rationality contracts require about something as fiercely "emotive,
fluid, and personal" as how they will feel about giving up the child
they have borne for someone else? Will they be economically or
psychologically vulnerable and be pressured into making agreements they will ultimately regret and even abjure? Will they be
willing and able to bargain aggressively to protect their interests?
Will they foresee when they sign the contract how they will feel
when the time comes to execute it? And, of course, the contract
produces a person who was not party to it-the child. The law will
have some interest in protecting that child, and in doing so the
law will again be returned to the standards problem.57
The other aspect of the facilitative function-the one which
allows people to recruit the law's power to effectuate their
individual intentions-has also emerged as a solution to some
bioethical problems. Primary examples are the living will and the
durable power of attorney. But these devices are also subject to
some of the uncertainties that characterize the facilitative
function. How far will people signing such a document fully
understand the circumstances in which it might be applied, fully
have thought about their own feelings about these distressing
subjects in the present, and accurately anticipate how they will
feel in the future? Will they have been unduly influenced by the
people around them? These questions are intended to suggest, of
course, that medical decisions are brutally hard to make under the
best of circumstances and that making them in a present that
might be unrecognizably different from the future is to make them
under quite deplorable circumstances. It is thus not surprising

57. For a fuller treatment of this problem, see Carl E. Schneider, Surrogate
Motherhood from the Perspective of Family Law, 13 Harv J L & Pub Pol 125 (1990);
Martha A. Field, Surrogate Motherhood: The Legal and Human Issues (Harv U Press,
1990); Symposium, In re Baby M, 76 Georgetown L J 1719 (1988). For discussions of the
related question of a market for adoptive children, see Elisabeth M. Landes and Richard
A. Posner, The Economics of the Baby Shortage, 7 J Legal Stud 323 (1978); Symposium,
Adoption and Market Theory, 67 BU L Rev 59 (1987).
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that there is evidence that advance directives have a good deal
less effect than we might like to believe.58
All these considerations suggest that we should constrain our
ever-soaring hopes that the devices of the facilitative function will
solve the bioethical dilemmas we now face. They also counsel us
that, if the facilitative function is to be given substantial legal
standing in bioethical decisions, it should at least be in a carefully
formalized way. Casual substitutes for careful thought should not
be encouraged, for the facilitative function achieves its deepest
justification only when it backs with the force of law people's
genuinely considered wishes. The questions I asked above are hard
enough where the prospect of signing a binding legal document
has brought home the fact that serious issues are being resolved.59 These questions become next to inipossible when, as in
Cruzan, the only evidence is the possibly quite casual remarks to
friends of a young person who is not aware that what she says will
have actual consequences and who does not expect to have
desperate medical problems for decades. And when the patient
was never in his life competent to formulate an opinion on
treatment, any attempt to decipher his intention must be wholly
fictional. 50

VIII.

CONCLUSION

This attempt to glean lessons for bioethics from family law
has yielded no determinate answers or easy principles. I have
suggested that family law has recently struggled to avoid the
58. See, for example, David Orentlicher, The Illusion ofPatient Choice in Eru:l-of-Life
Decisions, 267 JAMA 2101 -(1992). Lawyers are regularly surprised when the world
ignores legal rules, but by now they should not be. See, for example, Stewart Macaulay's
classic study of the use of contracts in business: Non-Contractual Relations in Business:
A Preliminary Study, 28 Am Soc Rev 55 (1963). On the distance between law and life in
one significant area of family law, see Schneider, 1991 BYU L Rev at 203-209 (cited in
note 2).
59. For a masterly demonstration of just how baffiing those questions can be even
in optimal conditions, see Patricia D. White, Appointing a Proxy Under the Best of
Circumstances, 1992 Utah L Rev 849.
60. See, for example, Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 370
NE2d 417 (Mass 1977), where the court struggled hopelessly to solve the problem by
attempting to do what the patient would have done had he been competent to decide for
himself. Id at 431. For a good statement of the limits of this "substituted judgment"
procedure, see Allen E. Buchanan and Dan W. Brock, Deciding for Others: The Ethics of
Surrogate Decision Making 112-22 (Cambridge U Press, 1989).
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standards problems. Yet I have argued that each method of doing
so is itself importantly flawed and sharply limited. I must confess
that, if anything, this survey has been too pessimistic, that it has
looked more assiduously for the drawbacks than the benefits of
each approach. I should also say that my survey has confined itself
to examining broad approaches, rather than seeking the surely
valuable lessons to be learned from family law's concrete, commonlaw resolutions of particular fact-patterns.
On the other hand, if my cautionary approach is essentially
correct, two conclusions might follow. The first is that the
standards problem might be confronted directly. My own inclination is that there is something in this. I am not persuaded, despite
some real evidence to the contrary, that the processes of democratic government are wholly incapable of resolving the kinds of value
conflicts that family law and bioethics present or that allowing
them to do so is wholly incompatible with a free society. But I
readily admit that this is only an inclination, and that I have not
fully worked out all my own views on the subject.61
The other conclusion that might be drawn from family law's
quandary is that we must content ourselves with imperfect
solutions to the perplexing issues family law and bioethics present
us. Perhaps one reason the approaches I have canvassed seem so
inadequate is that too much has been expected of the law. We
want the law always to reach the right result, and when in a
given case it fails to do so, we demand in our distress that
somehow the law should be changed. We insist that the law must
get every case right, and we are indignant when it fails (by our
lights) to do so. But family law and bioethics, like much oflaw, are
areas where it is hard to know what the right result is, where
often there will be no right result, and where there is no way of
assuring that the right result will consistently be reached. Both
areas, like much of law and life, involve what have been called
11
tragic choices11-irreducible conflicts between legitimate interests.62 We may, then, have to content ourselves with picking

61. For an attempt to work out some of those views in the particular context of the
law of alimony, see Schneider, 1991 BYU L Rev (cited in note 2).
62. For a general description of this problem, see Guido Calabresi and Philip Bobbitt,
Tragic Choices (WW Norton & Co, 1978). For a further treatment of it, one that has
much to say in particular about its appearance in the dispute over abortion, see Guido
Calabresi, Ideals, Beliefs, Attitudes, and the Law: Private Law Perspectives on a Public
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eclectically whichever approach seems best adapted to the
particular problem at hand, consoling ourselves with the realization that often human institutions can do no better than to muddle
through.

Law Problem (Syracuse U Press, 1985).

